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Abstract
We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination prob-
lems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating
to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that
such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative
statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads
to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt
players. We apply these “general equilibrium” findings to the problem of the labor
market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [11].
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1 Introduction
Coordination problems1 are usually analyzed in isolation. A typical model highlights
a single coordination problem characterized by a payoff function with strategic com-
plementarities and all other economic opportunities of players are summarized by an
exogenous outside option. Such models are analogous to the partial equilibrium ap-
proach and are useful for highlighting a particular economic feature. In this paper we
study the mutual interactions of several coordination problems in a setup analogous to
the general equilibrium approach. As is often the case, the subtle “general equilibrium”
effects lead to surprising comparative statics.
We set up the model within the framework of Matsuyama [11], who studies the
coordination problem of workers during industrialization.2 Matsuyama considers a single
emerging industry sector with increasing returns to scale and workers deciding between
joining the industry or joining agriculture which serves as a safe outside option. To
move to the “general equilibrium”, we consider several industries instead of one and
let players migrate among them, which allows examining the effects of mobility on
the extent of industrialization and, consequently, on welfare. Players are uniformly
matched to the industry sectors at the beginning of the game. The outside option of a
player born into sector (coordination problem) j, who considers staying in j, consists
of retraining/emigration which then allows her to join one of the other sectors. Thus
the outside option value in any coordination problem j is endogenously determined by
players’ behavior in all the other coordination problems. Another channel through which
the coordination problems mutually influence each other is that the mass of immigrants
to j depends on the coordination outcomes of all the other coordination problems.
Coordinating on an efficient but risky action is difficult to achieve and an increase
in the value of the outside option value further undermines the successful coordination.
Conversely, an increase in the mass of immigrants enhances coordination: first, the
immigrants to sector j directly increase the productivity in j because of the increasing
returns to scale; second, the players native to j are more motivated to stay in j which
further increases the participation in j.
A player leaving j imposes a direct negative externality on the players left behind
in j as she lowers productivity in j, and a direct positive externality on the players in
her new sector. But her migration also influences all the players also indirectly. Her
1Coordination problems are common in economics; for a review, see Cooper [3].
2We are grateful to the referee who pointed out this application.
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emigration from j decreases the outside option values in all the other sectors j′ 6= j,
hence players observing j′ coordinate on staying in j′ more often. However, the incentive
to leave j increases, and thus the coordination on staying in j becomes more difficult.
These causal links are difficult to analyze because of equilibrium multiplicity in
coordination games. We therefore use the global games approach, which allows us to
predict the coordination outcome in each sector j for given strategy profiles in all other
sectors. Global game approach is a reasonable selection tool for our purposes because
its comparative statics is indeed in line with the causal links described above.3
The uniqueness of equilibrium allows us to study comparative statics. We find
that the externalities discussed above lead to counterintuitive effects. Welfare is non-
monotonic in mobility: the direct non-strategic effect of an increase in mobility is pos-
itive, as, ignoring strategic considerations, moving to a successful sector is cheaper.
However, the strategic effect is negative: lower mobility cost increases the outside op-
tion value associated with the emigration, which undermines successful coordination.
Thus some sectors that would have succeeded had the mobility cost been high, fail
when the mobility cost is low. This negative strategic effect may outweigh the positive
direct effect and welfare may decrease with mobility.
The described game has a natural self-regulatory property. Consider, for instance,
a shift in the distribution of economic fundamentals towards poorer states of the world.
This decreases the outside option value as migrants end up in poorer sectors. The lower
value of the outside option enhances successful coordination and this positive strategic
effect partially counteracts the negative direct effect. Another channel through which the
self-regulatory mechanism operates is the increased mass of immigrants: the more sectors
that have poor fundamentals, the more players that migrate. This makes coordination
attempts more likely to succeed and thus helps to partially counteract the direct effect
of the distribution’s shift.
The benchmark result of two independent broad strands of literature, global games
(Carlsson and van Damme [2]) and the stochastic stability concept (Kandori, Mailath
and Rob [8]), is that risk dominance rather than Pareto dominance selects the equilib-
rium in coordination games. Given this benchmark result, the influence of mobility on
the coordination outcomes has been examined in various papers belonging to the latter
stream with the main conclusion that, if players are allowed to move and/or choose
3Global games were introduced by Carlsson and van Damme [2] and further developed by Morris and Shin
[14]. Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels [4] tested the theory experimentally and although they rejected the
quantitative predictions, they confirmed the qualitative features of the predicted comparative statics.
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with whom they interact, then the Pareto efficient equilibrium may prevail.4 Goyal and
Vega-Redondo [6] vary the cost of link formation and find an effect similar to the one
we find: welfare is non-monotonic with respect to mobility — the efficient equilibrium
prevails only at a high cost — while if the cost of the link formation is low the risk
dominant equilibrium prevails.
To our knowledge, mobility has not been studied within the global games literature.
However, the outside option value is often varied exogenously in global games appli-
cations, which leads, as in our model, to the tension between the positive direct and
the negative strategic effects; see the discussion of the strategic effect of a collateral on
creditors in Morris and Shin [15] and section 2.3.1 in [14] or the study of the influence
of demand-deposit contracts on bank run probability in Goldstein and Pauzner [5].
The model in Steiner [17] shares the non-trivial effects caused by the endogeneity of
the outside option with the model at hand but they differ in timing and interpretation.
We study many coordination problems simultaneously and emphasize the welfare effects
of mobility in the present model while Steiner [17] studies a time sequence of coordination
problems and emphasizes cycles endogenously arising in the equilibrium if players fear
bankruptcy and the associated loss of future profits.
Jeong [7] and Burdett, Imai and Wright [1] study “break-up” externalities which
occur when matched players search for new partners while not taking into account
the welfare loss of the abandoned partner. Jeong stresses the possible welfare-improving
consequences of mobility restrictions in environments with break-up externalities, which
is in line with our main finding. Burdett et al. focus on the multiplicity of equilibria; if
matched players search intensively, the partnerships become unstable and the intensive
search is the best response. We find a similar multiplicity in the case of a finite number
of sectors.
We describe the game formally in Section 2. We informally analyze the limit case of
a large number of sectors and precise signals in Section 3.2. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we
justify the informal shortcuts to the limit cases used in Section 3.2. Based on that we
return to the informal solution from Section 3.2 and analyze its comparative statics in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
4E.g. Oechssler [16]; Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked [10].
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2 The Model
We start by describing a standard static coordination game in Section 2.1. Then, build-
ing on this, we describe a mobile game in which players are able to migrate among
the coordination problems in Section 2.2. We link the abstract setup to the economic
problem of industrialization in Section 2.3.
2.1 The Static Game
There is a continuum of homogeneous, risk-neutral players of measure 1, one industry
sector and the players simultaneously decide whether to leave or stay in the sector; the
actions are denoted by 0 and 1 respectively. The payoff to those who have stayed is
pi(θ, l) =
{
1 if l ≥ 1− θ,
0 if l < 1− θ, (1)
where l is the measure of players who have stayed and 1− θ is the critical participation
needed for the sector’s success. The payoff for leaving the industry sector is a constant
V ∈ (0, 1). The payoff function (1) exhibits strategic complementarity; incentive to stay
in the industry increases in the measure of other players who stay, which typically leads
to equilibrium multiplicity. Clearly, for non-extreme values of θ, the game has two pure
strategy equilibria in which nobody, respectively everybody, stays.
Building on Carlsson and van Damme [2], Morris and Shin [14] show that the equi-
librium multiplicity disappears if a noise in observations of the sector’s fundamental θ
is assumed. We introduce this standard global game structure in the rest of this para-
graph: θ is a random variable distributed according to c.d.f. Φ(·). The players observe
an imprecise signal xi = θ+σi of the state θ, which itself is unobserved. The parameter
σ describes the size of the noise. The errors i are i.i.d. with c.d.f. F (·) and expectation
of the error is assumed to be well defined. Pure strategy is a function si : R → {0, 1}.
The static game is denoted by Γσ(V ).
2.2 The Mobile Game
In the static game, the productivity of the sector described by the function pi(θ, l) and
the outside option payoff V were postulated exogenously. Next we consider several
sectors simultaneously and assume that players who emigrated from their native sectors
immigrate to another of the remaining sectors. In such a mobile world, the payoff for
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staying in or leaving a particular sector depends on players’ behavior in the native sector
and all the other sectors as well.
There are J sectors indexed by j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J}; each sector j is characterized
by fundamental θj independently drawn from c.d.f. Φ(·).5 The corresponding p.d.f. is
bounded from above by some φ. Players are randomly and uniformly matched to the
sectors at the beginning of the game. The measure of players observing each sector is
normalized to 1. An individual player observing sector j is denoted by (j, i), j ∈ J ,
i ∈ [0, 1]; we will sometimes refer to the observers of sector j as j-players.
Each player (j, i) observes a private signal x(j,i) = θj + σ
i about the fundamental
of sector j and chooses staying in j or leaving it. Players who have left j are randomly
matched to one of the remaining sectors k ∈ J /{j} and each sector k receives 1
J−1 of
the emigrants from j.
We say that sector j is established early if the measure lj of j-players who stay in j
exceeds the critical measure 1−θj , and in such a case those who have stayed in j receive
payoff 1. Sector j will be established late if lj < 1− θj but lj + nj > 1− θj , where nj is
the measure of immigrants to j from all the other sectors and in such a case j-players
who have stayed in j receive payoff 1 − c, where the “penalty” c ∈ (0, 1). Sector j will
be not established if lj + nj < 1− θj, and in such a case j-players who have stayed in j
receive 0. The payoff of j-players staying in j is summarized by
cpi(θj , lj) + (1 − c)pi(θj , lj + nj),
with the function pi(·, ·) specified in (1).
The payoffs of emigrants are defined as follows: j-players who have left j receive
1 − c if they are matched to a sector which is established early or late and receive 0 if
they are matched to a sector which has not established.
Pure strategy is, as in the static game, a function s(j,i) : R → {0, 1}. A threshold
strategy is a particularly simple pure strategy characterized by a threshold x∗ such
that a player observing j stays if and only if x(j,i) > x∗ and leaves otherwise. sj is a
collection of strategies of all players observing sector j; formally sj : [0, 1]×R→ {0, 1},
s(j,i)(x) ≡ sj(i, x). Similarly, s−j is a collection of strategies of all players observing
sectors other than j; formally s−j : J /{j} × [0, 1] ×R→ {0, 1}, s(k,i)(x) ≡ s−j(k, i, x),
k 6= j. We call the whole game a mobile game and denote it by ΓMσ .
5The setup can be generalized to allow independent fundamentals drawn from different distributions.
6
2.3 Labor Market Interpretation
The mobile game has a intuitive interpretation within the framework of Matsuyama
[11]: the migration between the sectors takes place in real time and the penalty c is the
cost of delay. Players are interpreted as workers who can either directly join the sector
they are born into, or to retrain for another sector; retraining lasts T > 0. We interpret
the length T of the retraining as a degree of (im)mobility.
Worker receives an income stream w while working in a (yet) unestablished sector
or during the retraining. A worker working in an established sector receives an income
stream w > w. Sector j is established at time 0, T or never, depending on whether
1− θj < lj , lj < 1 − θj < lj + nj or lj + nj < 1 − θj. The discount factor is 0 < δ < 1.
The lifetime payoff of a worker who stays in an early established sector is
U =
∫ +∞
0
δtwdt,
a worker who stays in a late established sector or retrains to an established sector receives
M =
∫ T
0
δtwdt +
∫ +∞
T
δtwdt,
and a worker who stays in or immigrates to a sector which never gets established receives
D =
∫ +∞
0
δtwdt.
There exists an affine transformation of payoffs which maps U to 1, M to 1−c and D to
0 so the labor market setup corresponds to the above abstract setup, with c = U−M
U−D
=
1− δT . Note that c does not depend on w or w.
Steiner [18] examines other closely related setups: an immigrant is allowed to opt for
an outside option after she observes a signal about the fundamental of her new sector,
players are allowed to migrate repeatedly, migration is biased towards sectors with better
fundamentals, and general payoffs with strategic complementarities are examined. The
insights from the current model are robust to each of these modifications. Steiner [18]
assumes a continuum of sectors, which simplifies the analysis. In this paper we emphasize
that equilibrium in a game with a continuum of sectors is a good approximation for
equilibria under a large but finite number of sectors.
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3 Solution
3.1 Solution of the Static Game
The static game can be solved by applying Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin [14] to
the particular payoff function (1): The proposition states that the equilibrium threshold
solves the Laplacian equation ∫ 1
0
pi(x∗, l)dl = V. (2)
The left hand side of (2) simplifies to
L(x∗) =


0 if x∗ < 0,
x∗ if 0 ≤ x∗ ≤ 1,
1 if 1 < x∗,
and because V ∈ (0, 1), the unique root of (2) is x∗ = V , which we formally summarize
in:
Proposition 1. (Morris and Shin [14]) For each δ > 0 there exists such σ > 0 that
for all 0 < σ < σ, if strategy s survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies in
the game Γσ(V ), then s(x) = 0 for x < V − δ and s(x) = 1 for x > V + δ.
The equilibrium threshold x∗ increases in V , and thus industrialization is more likely
for low V . This confirms the insight of Matsuyama [11] who, using foresight dynamics
techniques, finds that productive agriculture has adverse effects on industrialization.
An increase of V has two distinct welfare effects. The direct effect is positive, but
the negative strategic effect consisting of the decrease in the probability of successful
coordination may prevail — welfare is non-monotonic in V .
3.2 Solution of the Mobile Game – Informal Approach
A player leaving sector j receives an expected payoff V , which depends on the equilibrium
strategies of all the other players. V is approximately a common value across all sectors
if the number of sectors J is large because then the impact of emigrants from any
particular sector j on success of any other particular sector k 6= j is negligible, as
only 1
J−1 of them immigrate to k. In the limit J → ∞, each sector receives the same
measure of immigrants and we denote this common value by n. Further in this section
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we informally solve the mobile game under the limit J →∞ and we postpone the formal
interpretation of this limit solution to Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Values V and n are defined for any equilibrium strategy profile and are bounded:
n ∈ [0, 1], and V ∈ [V , V ], V = (1 − c)(1 − Φ(1)), V = (1 − c)(1 − Φ(−1)) because an
emigrant may be matched to a sector with θ > 1, which surely succeeds, or to a sector
with θ < −1, which surely fails. Given any pair V and n, the observers of any particular
sector j face a global game with the Laplacian threshold condition
∫ 1
0
[cpi(x∗, l) + (1− c)pi(x∗, l + n)] dl = V,
which simplifies to
cL(x∗) + (1− c)L(x∗ + n) = V. (3)
The threshold player with Laplacian beliefs cannot be sure of success or failure of her
native sector in the second round, because V is bounded between V > 0 and V < 1− c;
if she were sure, she would not be indifferent between staying and leaving. Hence
0 < x∗ + n < 1, which allows rewriting (3) as
(1− c)(x∗ + n) +
{
cx∗ if x∗ ≥ 0,
0 if x∗ < 0
= V. (4)
A sector succeeds (at least) in the second round if and only if its fundamental exceeds
x∗. Otherwise the threshold player observing signal x = x∗ would be, in the limit of
precise signals, sure of the sector’s success. Hence
V = (1− c)(1 − Φ(x∗)). (5)
The measure of immigrants n to any sector is equal to the share of sectors with a
fundamental below x∗ because the matching for migrants to sectors is uniform:
n = Φ(x∗). (6)
Using (5) and (6), (4) can be written as
(1− c)(2Φ(x∗)− 1) +
{
x∗ if x∗ ≥ 0,
(1− c)x∗ if x∗ < 0 = 0, (7)
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Figure 1: The welfare is non-monotonic in c due to strategic effects.
and the left hand side is strictly increasing in x∗, and thus (7) has a unique root. Below
we will refer to (7) as the informal equation.
The solution of (7) leads to a complex comparative statics; for instance welfare is
non-monotonic in c, see Figure 1. However, before we analyze the comparative statics in
Section 4, we need to clarify the formal meaning of this informal solution. Namely, we
formally analyze the limit σ → 0 for any finite number J of sectors in Section 3.3, and
then examine the limit J → ∞ in Section 3.4. Readers uninterested in these technical
issues may wish to skip to Section 4.
3.3 Two Sectors
We formulate the results and the proofs in this section for the case of two sectors, ie.
J = 2. The results are generalized to any J ≥ 2 in Section 3.4.
In the first step, we fix a strategy profile s−j in sector −j and examine the induced
game Γσ(s−j); the set of players in Γσ(s−j) is the set of all j-players, they decide between
staying in j or leaving it and the payoff difference is denoted by p˜i(θj, lj ; s−j). We find
that:
Lemma 1. The game Γσ(s−j) satisfies all the six conditions in Proposition 2.2 in Morris
and Shin [14] for any fixed s−j.
We verify the six conditions in Appendix. In particular, the strategic complemen-
tarity holds because an increase of emigration from j increases the incentive to emigrate
for two reasons: the measure of participants in sector j decreases, and the measure of
participants in the other sector increases.
The game Γσ(s−j) induced by any fixed s−j can be solved as a global game:
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Lemma 2. For each δ > 0 there exists, uniformly for all s−j, such σ > 0 that for all
0 < σ < σ, if strategy s survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the game
Γσ(s−j) then s(x) = 0 for x < θ
∗
j (s−j) − δ and s(x) = 1 for x > θ∗j (s−j) + δ, where
θ∗j (s−j) is the unique root of the Laplacian equation
∫ 1
0
p˜i(θ∗j , lj ; s−j)dlj = 0.
Lemma 2 is an application of Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin [14] to the particular
payoff function p˜i(·, ·; s−j) but with making the statement uniform over all s−j. We check
in Appendix that the proof in [14] allows such strengthening.
Now we are prepared to formulate the main result of this section:
Proposition 2. For any δ > 0 there exists σ > 0 such that for any σ ≤ σ the mobile
game ΓMσ has only Bayes-Nash equilibria in which observers of sector j stay for x
(j,i) >
x∗j + δ and leave for x
(j,i) < x∗j − δ, where (x∗1, x∗2) solves the system of two equations,
j = 1, 2:
cL(x∗j )+(1−c)
(∫ x∗
−j
−∞
[
L(x∗j + 1)− L(θ−j)
]
dΦ(θ−j) +
∫ +∞
x∗
−j
[
L(x∗j )− L(θ−j + 1)
]
dΦ(θ−j)
)
= 0.
(8)
We denote the left hand side of (8) by g(x∗j , x
∗
−j).
Proposition 2 is a fixed point statement. Any strategy profile s−j in sector −j in-
duces a global game in sector j with a unique equilibrium profile sj and vice versa. We
are looking for such a pair of strategy profiles s1 and s2 that are mutually a “coordi-
nation response” to each other. This “coordination response” is not chosen by players
individually, rather the j-players as a group are driven by their individual optimiza-
tions to the strategy profile that is a “coordination response” to the strategy profile of
−j-players.
Lemma 1 and 2 state that, for small σ, the “coordination response” to any strategy
profile s−j (possibly asymmetric across players and with non-threshold strategies) is
a symmetric profile of threshold strategies, up to a small set of signals around the
threshold. Thus when looking for the fixed point of the “coordination responses”, we
can focus on the symmetric profiles of threshold strategies. The proof of Proposition 2
consists of showing that though there exists, for small but positive σ, a set of signals
around the threshold x∗j on which the “coordination response” may differ from the
selected action, the set is too small to alter the result.
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Further we utilize the equilibrium from Proposition 2 in the following way. We
assume that the errors in the observations of fundamentals are small, and therefore
the equilibrium selected in the limit σ → 0 is a good approximation of the actual
equilibrium. Formally we return to the complete information setup with σ ≡ 0 and
say that an equilibrium of the complete information game is robust to the global game
perturbation if it is summarized by two thresholds satisfying (8). Below we analyze the
properties of the robust equilibria.
Unlike the static global game, the mobile game may have multiple robust equilibria.
Figure 2 depicts the “coordination responses” according to (8) and each of the three
intersections constitutes a robust equilibrium. In addition to the symmetric equilibrium
which always exists, there may exist asymmetric equilibria in which one sector has a low
and the other sector a high threshold. E.g., if 1-players rarely emigrate then 2-players
are highly tempted to emigrate because the sector 1 often succeeds, hence 2-players
emigrate often, the sector 2 often fails, and 1-players are not too tempted to emigrate,
which confirms that they emigrate only rarely. The existence of asymmetric equilibria
allows one of the two ex ante identical sectors to succeed more often than the other.
The equilibrium multiplicity arises because the rate of emigration from any particular
sector has a non-negligible influence on the success of the other sector. In the next
section, we will consider J sectors, and state that for large J all robust equilibrium
thresholds lie in a small neighborhood of the informal solution (7). The intuition is
that, for large J , the immigration from any particular sector is a negligible part of the
total immigration mass, and thus all sectors receive approximately the same measure of
immigrants.
We examine the comparative statics of the informal solution in Section 4, because the
informal solution is a good approximation of the robust equilibria if the number of sectors
is finite but large. Alternatively, we could have continued the analysis with the two
sectors setup, and examine the comparative statics of the symmetric equilibrium. The
results are qualitatively the same, however the first approach bypasses the equilibrium
selection and a finite but large number of sectors seems to be a reasonable assumption
from the applied point of view.
3.4 Many Sectors
Next, we generalize the system of equations (8) from Proposition 2 to the case of J > 2
sectors. Let XJ−j = (x
J
1 , . . . , x
J
j−1, x
J
j+1, . . . , x
J
J). Robust thresholds x
∗J
1 , . . . , x
∗J
J satisfy
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Figure 2: The threshold in sector j as a “coordination response” to the threshold in −j. Each
of the three intersections constitutes an equilibrium.
gJ(x∗Jj ,X
∗J
−j) = 0 where g
J (x∗Jj ,X
∗J
−j) equals
cL(x∗Jj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+(1−c)E

L
(
x∗Jj +
∑
k 6=j ek
J − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
− 1
J − 1
∑
k 6=j
∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, 1− ek +
∑
m6=j,k em + 1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
III

 .
(9)
The expectation is taken with respect to the random realization of fundamentals in all
k 6= j sectors, and ek denotes the emigration from sector k, hence ek is a random variable
equal to 1 if θk > x
∗J
k and 0 if θk < x
∗J
k .
The term I is the expected payoff under the Laplacian belief for staying in j during
the first period before the immigrants arrive. The term II is the expected payoff for
staying in j in the second period after the immigrants arrive. The term III is the
expected payoff for leaving sector j, that is, player is allocated to one of the remaining
sectors k 6= j, whose success depends on θk, and on the measure of players participating
in k: the measure 1− ek of k-players who stay in k are joined by the measure of immi-
grants from m 6= k, j and by the measure of immigrants 1− lj from j.6 Generalization
of the proof of Proposition 2 to J > 2 is straightforward but notationally cumbersome,
6The threshold j-player’s beliefs over the immigration from j and k 6= j differ because she has the Laplacian
belief about the measure of players staying in/leaving j.
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and we therefore omit it.
The following proposition states that for finite but large J , all robust equilibrium
thresholds lie close to the informal solution: Let x∗J1 , . . . , x
∗J
J denote the thresholds in a
robust equilibrium of the mobile game with J sectors.
Proposition 3. For any  > 0 there exist J ′ such that for all J > J ′
|x∗Jj − x∗| < ,
for all j = 1, . . . , J , where x∗ is the root of (7).
Each sector j faces an environment defined by the behavior in sectors k 6= j sectors. If
J is large, each sector faces approximately the same environment, as the influence of any
particular sector is negligible. Hence the solution has to be approximately symmetric,
which is the main idea of the proof (delegated to Appendix).
4 Comparative Statics
Proposition 3 implies that the informal solution is a good prediction for the equilibrium
threshold under a setup with a large but finite number of sectors. With this interpreta-
tion in mind we return to examine the comparative statics of the solution of (7).
We start by examining the comparative statics with respect to changes in the distri-
bution of fundamentals Φ(·). The left hand side of (7) increases in Φ(x∗) and thus the
implicit function theorem implies:
Finding 1. Let x∗ be the equilibrium threshold under the distribution of fundamen-
tals Φ(·), and x′∗ under the distribution of fundamentals Φ′(·). If Φ′(·) stochastically
dominates Φ(·) then x′∗ > x∗.
Thus an improvement in the distribution of fundamentals increases the threshold.
Intuitively, an improvement in Φ(·) increases the expected payoff of emigration as the
chance of being matched to an established sector increases, and decreases the expected
threshold payoff for staying as the measure of immigrants decreases. The increase of
the threshold x∗ increases the probability p = Φ(x∗) of a sector’s failure, which par-
tially offsets the direct effect of the improvement in Φ(·). However, the direct positive
effect always prevails and the equilibrium probability of a sector’s failure unambiguously
decreases with an improvement in Φ(·):
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Finding 2. Let x∗ be the equilibrium threshold under the distribution of fundamentals
Φ(·), and x′∗ under the distribution Φ′(·). If Φ′(·) stochastically dominates Φ(·) then
Φ′(x′∗) < Φ(x∗).
The proof of Finding 2 is the following: We substitute x∗ = Φ−1(p) into (7) and get
(1− c)(2p − 1) +
{
Φ−1(p) if Φ−1(p) ≥ 0,
(1− c)Φ−1(p) if Φ−1(p) < 0 = 0. (10)
The left hand side of (10) increases in p and an improvement from Φ(·) to Φ′(·) causes an
increase in the left hand side of (10) which, according to the implicit function theorem,
implies Finding 2.
Finding 2 directly translates into comparative statics with respect to the population
size. If the measure of players per sector is changed from 1 to n > 0 then the critical
labor mass needed for the success of sector changes from 1− θ to 1−θ
n
. Thus the change
of the population has the same effect as keeping the population size at 1 but shifting
the fundamental in the following way:7
θ → θ′ = ϑn(θ) =
{
1− 1
n
(1− θ) if θ < 1,
θ if θ > 1.
The distribution of θ′ is Φ′n(·) ≡ Φ(ϑ−1n (·)) and hence, as ϑn(·) increases in n, Φ′n′(·)
stochastically dominates Φ′n(·) for n′ > n, which, together with Finding 2, implies:
Finding 3. The equilibrium probability of a sector’s failure decreases in the population
size n per sector.
Next we examine the comparative statics with respect to c. Equation (7) has different
properties for x∗ < 0 than for x∗ > 0. In the case x∗ < 0 it simplifies to
2Φ(x∗)− 1 + x∗ = 0,
and thus:
Finding 4. If the equilibrium threshold x∗ is negative, it is not sensitive to local changes
in c.
7For θ > 1 the sector succeeds for any population size n and any l.
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In the case x∗ > 0, equation (7) simplifies to
(1− c)(2Φ(x∗)− 1) + x∗ = 0. (11)
The left hand side of (11) increases in c because (2Φ(x∗) − 1) = −x∗1−c is negative for
x∗ > 0. The implicit function theorem implies:
Finding 5. If the equilibrium threshold x∗ is positive then it increases in c.
Intuitively, an increase in c by dc makes both staying in and leaving the sector less
attractive. The expected payoff for leaving j is (1 − c)(1 − Φ(x∗)) and it decreases by
dcΦ(x∗). The expected payoff for staying in j under the Laplacian beliefs decreases by
dcn = dcΦ(x∗).8 For Φ(x∗) < 12 , which is implied by x
∗ > 0, the adverse effect on the
payoff for leaving prevails and hence the equilibrium threshold must decrease — this
increases the payoff for leaving, decreases the Laplacian threshold payoff for staying,
and thus restores the balance.
Further we analyze welfare consequences of changes in c where welfare is defined as
expected payoff before the observation of signal:9 (p denotes the equilibrium probability
of a sector’s failure.)
W = (1− p) + p(1− p)(1− c).
The total welfare effect dW
dc
consists of the direct effect ∂W
∂c
= −p(1 − p) ≤ 0 which
is negative, and of the strategic effect ∂W
∂p
dp
dc
. The strategic effect is positive, as ∂W
∂p
is
negative, and according to Finding 5 the derivative dp
dc
< 0. The total effect is ambiguous,
both the negative direct or the positive strategic effect can prevail, see Figure 1. Below
we describe conditions under which the strategic effect dominates.
The equation (11) defines x∗ (and hence p) only implicitly, and so it is generally
possible to express dW
dc
only as a function of x∗ (and p). However, it is possible to
obtain an explicit expression for x∗, and hence for dW
dc
in the limit of a very narrow prior
distribution. Formally, the prior distribution is set to be Φ(θ−y
ω
) and we examine the
equilibrium in the limit ω → 0 in which the root of (7) can be expressed explicitly:
Finding 6. The equilibrium threshold x∗ and failure probability p as functions of y in
the limit ω → 0 are
8This is because according to (3) the Laplacian threshold payoff for staying is cL(x∗)+ (1− c)L(x∗+n) =
x∗ + (1− c)n.
9We analyze only the case x∗ > 0. The welfare analysis is straightforward for x∗ < 0, as there is no indirect
welfare effect.
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y < −1 −1 ≤ y < 0 0 ≤ y < 1− c 1− c < y
x∗ −1 y y 1− c
p 1 1−y2
1
2 − y2(1−c) 0
.
Further we look for pairs of y and c for which the total welfare effect dW
dc
is positive
(in the limit ω → 0). The first condition is 0 ≤ y < 1 − c otherwise dp
dc
= 0. If this
condition is satisfied, then using the expression p = 12 − y2(1−c) from Finding 6, the total
welfare effect dW
dc
= ∂W
∂c
+ ∂W
∂p
dp
dc
simplifies into
dW
dc
=
−(c− 1)2 − (y − 1)2 + 1
4(1 − c)2 ,
which implies:
Finding 7. The set of pairs (c, y) at which the total welfare effect is positive (in the
limit ω → 0) is the one depicted in Figure 3.
While a “partial” equilibrium analysis of a coordination problem would suggest that
an improvement of the prior distribution by a slight increase in y would dramatically
increase welfare because the probability of a sector’s failure would decrease to 0, we
find that this is not the case in a mobile world. The threshold increases with y, and
the decrease in the probability of failure is only proportional to the increase in y, for
y ∈ (−1, 1).
We now return to the labor market interpretation introduced in Section 2.3. Welfare
in the labor market is w + (w − w)W1−δT where W1−δT is the welfare in the abstract
setup studied above if c is set to c = 1− δT . The function 1− δT increases in the length
of the retraining period T and thus welfare at the labor market increases in T if and
only if welfare in the abstract game increases at c = 1 − δT . Note that the sign of the
welfare effect is entirely independent of w and w, and depends only on T .
The labor market interpretation of the abstract mobile game is not the only one
possible. Alternatively we could stress the capital side of industrialization and interpret
the players as investors. The penalty for the late investment or for the late success can
originate in increased government regulations in post-industrialized society. Finding 7
suggests that the welfare effect of the regulations is ambiguous. While the regulations
surely decrease the returns of late investors or of those whose sectors succeed late, the
expectation of the regulations may increase welfare by enhancing efficient coordination
at the beginning of the industrialization.
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Figure 3: The total welfare effect is positive for pairs (c, y) in the shaded area.
In order to examine additional comparative statics, we consider the abstract game
with general payoff parameters U > U − γ > D, instead of 1 > 1− c > 0 and vary U or
D keeping other parameters constant.10 The threshold x∗ under payoffs U , U − γ and
D equals to the threshold solving (7) with c = γ
U−D
, so the strategic effect of variation
in U or D can be straightforwardly mapped to the strategic effects with respect to c
in the abstract game. The direct effect of increasing U or D is positive; the indirect
effect of increasing D is positive as well, because, according to Finding 5, an increase in
D increases c which decreases equilibrium probability of a sector’s failure. In contrast,
c decreases in U , and thus an increase in U has a negative strategic effect which can
override the positive direct effect. This is summarized by:
Finding 8. The welfare effects of an increase in U or D have the following signs:
Increase in: U D
Direct effect + +
Strategic effect - +
Total effect ± +
.
Counterintuitively, more productive technologies do not necessarily facilitate indus-
trialization. If the new inventions are highly productive, the temptation to leave the
10The payoffs U , U − γ and D are not independent under the labor market interpretation, so such a
comparative statics is useful only for alternative applications of the abstract mobile game.
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native industry for a more promising one is high. The losses from the excessive mobility
may override the direct advantage of the high productivity.
5 Concluding Remarks
While our main economic application is the labor aspect of industrialization, the model
is abstract enough to accommodate other interpretations. We could reinterpret the
industry sectors as different geographical locations and assume increasing returns to scale
in local industries as discussed in Krugman [9]. The mobile game with its non-monotonic
welfare effect of increased mobility would then be a simple model of globalization.
By focusing the discussion on the counterintuitive comparative statics we have ex-
posed ourselves to the danger of overemphasizing the negative consequences of mobility.
While we find that an increase in mobility may lead to a decrease in welfare, the finding
is sensitive to the model’s parameters. Also, though the presented model has a unique
equilibrium in the limit of many sectors; a general payoff function may lead to equilib-
rium multiplicity, similar in the logic to the one we encountered in the case of a few
sectors. See Steiner [18] who, in a related model, provides the examples of setups leading
to such equilibrium multiplicity, the underlying intuition and sufficient conditions for
equilibrium uniqueness in the limit of many sectors.
Thus, rather than in particular policy recommendations, the contribution of the
model is in building intuition needed for judging the tension between mobility and
ability of local coordination. More generally, the model transfers the understanding of
the distinction between partial and general equilibrium analysis from market systems to
coordination problems. The “partial equilibrium” approach to coordination problems,
which has been prevalent in the existing research, is useful in focusing the model on
a particular economic problem, but we should be aware of the “general equilibrium”
effects it abstracts from.
In particular, the equilibrium threshold in a static global game is independent of
the prior distribution Φ(·) in the limit σ → 0 and hence the global game theory can
be used as an equilibrium selection in an isolated complete information coordination
problem. In contrast, the prior has an influence on the equilibrium threshold in the
mobile game even in the limit σ → 0. Once the players have the means to choose the
coordination problem they participate in, it may be misleading to select an equilibrium
in a coordination problem in isolation from other problems because the whole set of
coordination problems interacts as a result of the “general equilibrium” effects.
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A Proofs
Proof. (Lemma 1) Each strategy profile s−j induces some joint distribution Ξs−j(nj , n−j, θ−j)
over nj, n−j and θ−j, where nj denotes measure of −j-players who immigrate into j,
and n−j the measure of −j-players who stay in −j.11 We define
pi′(θj, lj ;nj , n−j, θ−j) = cpi(θj , lj) + (1− c)pi(θj , lj + nj)− (1− c)pi(θ−j , 1− lj + n−j),
which is the incentive to stay in j for a fixed triple nj, n−j , θ−j.
The payoff difference between staying and leaving sector j is
p˜i(θj , lj ; s−j) ≡
∫
pi′(θj , lj ;nj, n−j , θ−j)dΞs−j (nj, n−j, θ−j).
We check that p˜i(θj , lj ; s−j) satisfies all six assumptions of Proposition 2.2. in Morris
and Shin [14]:
1. (Action Monotonicity) pi′(θj , lj ;nj, n−j , θ−j) is weakly increasing in lj for any
nj, n−j, θ−j and thus p˜i(θj, lj ; s−j) is weakly increasing in lj after we integrate
over nj, n−j , θ−j.
2. (State Monotonicity) pi′(θj, lj ;nj , n−j, θ−j) is weakly increasing in θj for any nj, n−j, θ−j
and thus p˜i(θj, lj ; s−j) is weakly increasing in θj after we integrate over nj , n−j, θ−j.
3. (Unique Laplacian State) The Laplacian payoff
∫ 1
0 p˜i(θj , lj ; s−j)dlj is not strictly
monotone, as the payoff function p˜i(·, ·; s−j) is only weakly monotone, however we
prove single crossing — the Laplacian payoff is strictly increasing at the root of
the Laplacian equation (with the slope bounded from zero uniformly over all s−j):
We call pair (θ, n) unresolved if n < 1 − θ < n + 1. This terminology reflects
that, for unresolved (θ, n), sector with fundamental θ and measure of immigrants
n has a probability of success in the second round (under the uniform distribution
of l) strictly between 0 and 1. Thus the derivative of the probability of the (late)
success with respect to θ is 1, for unresolved (θ, n).12
The probability of the late success of sector j (under the uniform distribution of
lj) is bounded between p ≡ V1−c and p ≡ V1−c at the root of the Laplacian equation∫ 1
0 p˜i(θj, lj ; s−j)dlj = 0; the bounds V and V on the payoff for emigration were
11nj and n−j are trivially dependent as, in the two sectors setup, nj + n−j = 1. However, this notation
facilitates the generalization of the proof to cases J > 2.
12This derivative is zero if (θ, n) is not unresolved, which is the reason why this property is useful.
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established in Section 3.2. Otherwise the threshold player with Laplacian beliefs
would strictly prefer leaving or staying in j and the indifference implied by the
Laplacian equation would not hold.
Consider θj > 0: 1 − θj < nj + 1 for all nj ∈ [0, 1] and hence the probabil-
ity that the sector j succeeds (under uniform distribution of lj) is strictly posi-
tive for any measure of immigrants nj. Be θj the root of the Laplacian equation∫ 1
0 p˜i(θj, lj ; s−j)dlj = 0. Then under the distribution of nj induced by s−j
Prob
(
nj + 1− (1− θj) > p+ 1
2
)
≤ b,
where b solves p+12 b+(1− b)0 = p. In words, if nj +1− (1− θj) > p+12 then, under
Laplacian beliefs, probability of success of j, which is nj + 1 − (1 − θj), exceeds
p+1
2 , and if the measure of immigrant nj would be so high with a probability higher
than b, the total probability of success, would exceed p. Thus, if θj is the root of
the Laplacian equation, then the probability that (θj, nj) is unresolved is at least
1 − b > 0. The derivative of the Laplacian payoff with respect to the threshold
under a fixed nj is one if (θj, nj) is unresolved. Hence, after we integrate over nj,
∂
∂θj
∫ 1
0 p˜i(θj , lj ; s−j)dlj ≥ (1− b)(1− c) > 0.
The symmetric argument applies for θj < 0. In the case of θj = 0 we can apply the
argument from the case θj > 0 for the right hand side derivative and the argument
from the case θj < 0 for the left hand side derivative. Hence the derivative of the
Laplacian expected payoff is positive at the root of the Laplacian equation, for any
s−j, which establishes the single-crossing.
4. (Limit Dominance) The payoff for leaving j is bounded by the bounds 0 < V <
V < 1. Measure nj of immigrants to j is bounded by 0 and 1, and thus p˜i(θj , lj ; s−j)
is strictly negative for θj < −1 and strictly positive for θj > 1.
5. (Continuity)
∫ 1
0
g(lj)pi
′(θj , lj ;nj, n−j , θ−j)dlj =
Prob(lj > 1− θj)c+ Prob(lj + nj > 1− θj)(1− c)− Prob(1− lj + nj > 1− θ−j) =
(1−G(1 − θj))c+ (1−G(1 − θj − nj))(1 − c)−G(θ−j + n−j)(1 − c),
where G(·) is the c.d.f. of g(·). Thus ∫ g(lj)pi′(θj, lj ;nj , n−j, θ−j)dl is continuous
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with respect to density g(·) and with respect to θj for any nj, n−j, θ−j . This is
preserved when we integrate over nj, n−j , θ−j.
6. (Finite Expectation of Errors) Satisfied by the assumption on the error distribu-
tion.
Proof. (Lemma 2) We check that the proof in Morris and Shin [14] allows for the state-
ment in Lemma 2 to be uniform over all fixed strategy profiles s−j in sector −j:
Morris and Shin define p˜iσ(x, k; s−j) to be the expected payoff for staying conditional
on observing signal x when all other j-players have a threshold strategy with threshold
k, and s−j is fixed. The authors show in their Lemma 6.1 that, for a fixed s−j, it is
possible to find dominance regions for p˜iσ(x, k; s−j) uniformly for σ below some σ > 0.
We add that the dominance regions can be specified uniformly across all s−j because
the expected payoff for leaving is bounded between 0 < V < V < 1. Thus the left
dominance region can be taken from the game which pays V for leaving and the right
dominance region from the game which pays V for leaving.
In their Lemma 6.2 Morris and Shin prove that, fixing s−j, p˜iσ(x, x − σξ; s−j) con-
verges to p˜i∗σ(x, x−σξ; s−j) as σ → 0, where p˜i∗σ(x, k; s−j) is the variable corresponding to
the uniform prior and private values, and the convergence is uniform for x in a compact
interval.13 We add, in the rest of the proof, that this convergence is uniform over all
s−j:
p˜iσ(x, k; s−j) =
∫
pi′σ(x, k;nj , n−j , θ−j)dΞs−j (nj, n−j , θ−j),
where pi′σ(x, k;nj , n−j, θ−j) is the expected payoff conditional on signal x when all oppo-
nents use threshold k under the payoff function pi′(θj , lj ;nj, n−j , θ−j). Be pi
′∗
σ (x, k;nj , n−j, θ−j)
the variable corresponding the uniform prior and private values under the same payoff
function pi′(θj , lj ;nj, n−j , θ−j).
We have restricted ourselves to x from a compact interval, nj and n−j lie in [0, 1],
and we can restrict to θ−j in [−1, 1] because its further decrese/increase beyond [−1, 1]
does not influence the success of sector −j.
13We can constraint ourselves to a compact interval after eliminating the dominance regions.
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Morris and Shin prove that
pi′σ(x, k;nj , n−j, θ−j) =
∫ 1
l=0
pi′
(
k − σF−1(l), l;nj , n−j, θ−j
)
ψσ(l;x, k)dl,
where ψσ(·;x, k) is p.d.f. corresponding to c.d.f. Ψσ(·;x, k) and Ψσ(l;x, x−σξ) uniformly
converges to Ψ∗σ(l;x, x − σξ) ≡ 1 − F
(
ξ + F−1(1− l)) as σ → 0. The c.d.f. Ψ∗σ(l;x, k)
corresponds to a game with uniform prior distribution.
Hence pi′σ(x, x−σξ;nj , n−j, θ−j) converges to pi′∗σ (x, x−σξ;nj , n−j, θ−j) and the con-
vergence is uniform over x from a compact interval and over ξ because variation in ξ gen-
erates a compact set of distributions over l. We only need to add, that because we con-
sider a compact set of (nj , n−j, θ−j), the convergence is uniform also over (nj, n−j , θ−j).
Hence after integrating over (nj , n−j, θ−j) with the distribution Ξs−j(nj, n−j , θ−j), we
get uniform convergence over all s−j.
The rest of the proof in Morris and Shin relies on the fact that p˜iσ(x, x − σξ; s−j)
converges uniformly to p˜i∗σ(x, x− σξ; s−j) and needs not to be altered for our needs.
Proof. (Proposition 2) Consider any equilibrium profile s = (s1, s2) in the mobile game
ΓMσ . The profile induces two thresholds x
∗
j(σ), j = 1, 2 that are solving the Laplacian
equations in the global games Γσ(sj), j = 1, 2. Using Lemma 2, there exists a function
δ(σ) > 0, limσ→0 δ(σ) = 0, such that the equilibrium strategies in Γ
M
σ satisfy s
(j,i)(x) = 1
for x > x∗j (σ) + δ(σ) and s
(j,i)(x) = 0 for x < x∗j (σ)− δ(σ); j = 1, 2.14
Lemma 3. There exists a function (·) > 0 such that limσ→0 (σ) = 0, and
∣∣g (x∗j(σ), x∗−j(σ))∣∣ < (σ)
for j = 1, 2.
Proof. x∗j(σ) satisfies
cL
(
x∗j(σ)
)
+(1−c)
∫ +∞
−∞
[
L
(
x∗j (σ) + 1− l−j,σ(θ−j)
)− L(θ−j + l−j,σ(θ−j))] dΦ(θ−j) = 0,
(12)
14The equilibrium profile in ΓMσ , σ > 0, need not consist of threshold strategies. Lemma 2 only guaranties
that there exist thresholds x∗j (σ) such that the equilibrium strategies differ from the threshold strategy only
on a neighborhood of thresholds thresholds x∗j (σ).
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where l−j,σ(θ−j) is the measure of −j-players who stay in −j under the fundamental
θ−j, strategy profile s−j(σ), and error size σ. Be l−j,0(θ−j) the function corresponding
to the threshold strategy with threshold x∗−j and σ = 0, that is l−j,0(θ−j) = 1 for
θ−j > x
∗
−j(σ) and 0 otherwise. By replacing l−j,σ with l−j,0 in the left hand side of (12)
we get g
(
x∗j (σ), x
∗
−j(σ)
)
. The difference caused by the replacement is smaller than
(σ) ≡ 2φ(1− c) (δ(σ) +√σ)+ (1− c)max(F (− 1√
σ
)
, 1− F
(
1√
σ
))
(13)
The first term comes from integration over interval
[
x∗−j(σ)− δ(σ) −
√
σ, x∗−j(σ) + δ(σ) +
√
σ
]
.
Outside of this interval, the difference between l−j,σ and l−j,0 is bounded by
max
(
F
(
− 1√
σ
)
, 1− F
(
1√
σ
))
which gives the second term in (13)
Function g(·, ·) is continuous, thresholds x∗j (σ) are from a closed interval and thus
there exists a function ′(σ) > 0, limσ→0 
′(σ) = 0, such that |x∗j (σ) − x∗j | < ′(σ),
j = 1, 2 where (x∗1, x
∗
2) is a solution of (8).
Then, the j-players in ΓMσ stay in j for signals above x
∗
j + δ
′(σ) and leave below
x∗j − δ′(σ) where δ′(σ) = ′(σ) + δ(σ).
Proof. (Proposition 3) Below, we omit asterisk from the notation of the threshold and
instead of x∗Jj write simply x
J
j .
Let XJ denote (xJ1 , . . . , x
J
J). We introduce a system of approximate equations,
g˜J(xJj ,X
J ) = 0, where g˜J (xJj ,X
J ) equals
cL(xJj )+(1−c)E
[
L
(
xJj +
∑J
k=1 ek
J − 1
)
− 1
J − 1
J∑
k=1
∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, 1− ek +
∑
m6=k em + 1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj
]
.
(14)
The difference between the correct equations (9) and the approximate equations (14) is
that in (14) we allow index k and m to equal j.15
Approximate equations are a good approximation of the exact equations if J is large:
15In words in (14) we “add” one virtual sector with the threshold equal to xj and with an independent
realization of fundamental. This assures that in (14) all sectors j = 1, . . . , J face identical environment of
other sectors.
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Lemma 4. There exists α > 0 such that
∣∣g˜Jj (xJj ,XJ )− gJj (xJj ,XJ−j)∣∣ ≤ αJ − 1 ,
for all j = 1, . . . , J and all XJ ∈ [−1, 1]J .
Proof. (Lemma 4) The first terms in (9) and (14) are identical. The difference between
(9) and (14) in the second term is that the approximate equation overstates the measure
of immigrants to j, but at most by 1
J−1 and derivative of L(·) is bounded by 1 which leads
to a difference at most 1−c
J−1 . There are two differences in the third term: the approximate
equation has one additional summand in the sum over index k, with the value of the
summand at most 1
J−1 which leads to a difference at most
1−c
J−1 . The additional summand
in the sum over the index m leads to a difference at most (1− c) 2
J−1φ because∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, nk +
1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj −
∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, nk +
1
J − 1 +
1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj
∣∣∣∣∣
is 0 if 1−θk lies outside of [nk, nk+ 2J−1 ] and is at most 1 if θk ∈ [nk, nk+ 2J−1 ]. Thus, in
expectation with respect to θk, the additional measure of immigrants in the approximate
equation can cause a difference at most (1 − c) 2
J−1φ. The total difference between (9)
and (14) is thus at most
[
(1− c) + (1− c) + (1− c)2φ] 1
J−1 .
Lemma 4 implies that any solution x∗J1 , . . . , x
∗J
J of the correct system (9) approxi-
mately solves the approximate system (14):
∣∣g˜Jj (x∗Jj ,X∗J )∣∣ ≤ αJ − 1 for all j = 1, . . . , J. (15)
The argument identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 1 point 3 (unique Laplacian
state), establishes that the derivative ∂
∂x∗Jj
g˜Jj (x
∗J
j ,X
∗,J ) is bounded from below at the
root of the approximate equations with a positive bound denoted here as b which is
uniform over all J . Hence
|x∗Jj − x∗Jj′ | ≤
2α
b(J − 1) for all j, j
′ = 1, . . . , J. (16)
We introduce function γJ : R → R, where γJ(x) ≡ g˜Jj (x, x, . . . , x). Next, using the
following Lemma, we establish that γJ(x∗Jj ), j = 1, . . . , J , are close to zero:
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Lemma 5. There exists β > 0 such that
∂
∂xJj′
∣∣g˜Jj (xJj , xJ1 , xJ2 , . . . , xJJ)∣∣ < βJ − 1 , j′ 6= j. (17)
Proof. (Lemma 5) The derivative of the second term in (14) with respect to xJj′ is, in
absolute value, at most (1− c) 1
J−1φ. The derivative of the third term is proportional to
1
J−1 as shown in the rest of the proof. We will use the following:
∂
∂nj′
∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, nj′ +
1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj
is J − 1 if nj′ ≤ 1− θj′ ≤ nj′ + 1J−1 and 0 otherwise. Thus
∂
∂nj′
E
[∫ 1
lj=0
pi
(
θk, nj′ +
1− lj
J − 1
)
dlj
]
is at most (J − 1) 1
J−1φ = φ.
The derivative of the third term in (14) with respect to xJj′ consists of two parts: 1.
The derivative of the summand when k = j′ is at most (1 − c) 1
J−1φ. 2. The inflow of
immigrants to all sectors indexed by k 6= j′ changes, which leads to the derivative at
most, in absolute value, (1− c) 1
J−1 (J − 1) φJ−1 .
Inequality (16) and Lemma 5 imply
|g˜Jj (x∗Jj , x∗Jj , x∗Jj , . . . , x∗Jj )− g˜Jj (x∗Jj , x∗J1 , x∗J2 , . . . , x∗JJ )| ≤ (J − 1)
β
J − 1
2α
b(J − 1) , (18)
and hence, using (15)
|γJ(x∗Jj )| =
∣∣gJ (x∗Jj , x∗Jj , x∗Jj , . . . , x∗Jj )∣∣ ≤
(
β2α
b
+ α
)
1
J − 1 ,
for all j = 1 . . . J .
γJ(x∗Jj ) differs from the left hand side of the informal equation (7) by the fact that
the measures of immigrants to sector j and k are stochastic. The weak law of large
numbers assures that γJ(x∗Jj ) converges to the left hand side of the informal equation
(7), and the convergence is uniform, because the derivative of the second and third term
in (14) with respect to the measure of immigrants are bounded.
We denote the left hand side of the informal equation by γ(x∗). For any ′ > 0
26
there exist J ′ such that |γ(x∗Jj )| < ′ for all J > J ′ and j = 1, . . . J . Function γ(·)
is continuous and x∗Jj are from the closed interval [−1, 1 − c]. Hence there must exist
function (′) such that |x∗Jj −x∗| < (′), where x∗ is the unique root of γ(x∗) = 0, and
lim′→0 (
′) = 0.
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